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First-Person Authority and Self-Knowledge as
an Achievement
Josep E. Corbı´
Abstract: There is much that I admire in Richard Moran’s account of how first-
person authority may be consistent with self-knowledge as an achievement. In
this paper, I examine his attempt to characterize the goal of psychoanalytic
treatment, which is surely that the patient should go beyond the mere theoretical
acceptance of the analyst’s interpretation, and requires instead a more intimate,
first-personal, awareness by the patient of their psychological condition.
I object, however, that the way in which Moran distinguishes between the
deliberative and the theoretical attitudes is ultimately inconsistent with a
satisfactory account of psychoanalytic practice; mainly because, despite Moran’s
claims to the contrary, such a distinction is still inspired by a Cartesian picture of
the self. I argue that, in the light of his distinction, Moran may emphasize that an
agent’s psychological dispositions should be permeable to her decisions and
projects, but is forced to reject the idea that permeability could go the other way
too. I explore Bernard Williams’ notion of acknowledgment and Simone Weil’s
distinction between two notions of necessity, in order to articulate a notion of
receptive passivity which may help us to characterize this second direction of
permeability. I finally outline why receptive passivity (and, thereby, the double
direction of permeability) is crucial in order to identify the goal of psychoanalytic
treatment and, derivatively, to understand how a certain kind of awareness may
have a significant therapeutic effect.
1. The Issue
The Parallel Campaign was designed as an essentially Austrian project to
celebrate the 70th jubilee of Emperor Franz Josef in 1918. It was, nevertheless,
meant to counteract the effects of a similar campaign organized by Germany for
the 30th jubilee of their Emperor, Wilhelm II. Diotima, a charming and well-
educated lady, hosted the inaugural session of the Parallel Campaign and, in a
significant breach of protocol, she invited Arnheim, a prominent Prussian, to join
the meeting. As the narrator, in Robert Musil’s The Man without Qualities,
remarks, this slip was due to the fact that Diotima was in love with her guest,
even if she ‘had no inkling of the nature of her feeling’.1
If Rachel, Diotima’s graceful servant, had asked the latter whether she meant
to invite Arnheim to the inaugural session, Diotima might have answered ‘Yes’.
And not even such a thought-provoking writer as Musil would have doubted
Diotima’s epistemic authority in this respect. Neither might Musil have tried to
detail the evidence in virtue of which Diotima might have acquired such a robust
piece of self-knowledge. A demand for evidence could only have been proposed
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as a sort of joke, but hardly to reveal a deeper truth about Diotima’s
psychological condition. The standard debate about self-knowledge tends to
focus on the sort of first-person authority that is revealed by the fact that Diotima’s
self-ascription of her intention to invite Arnheim cannot be reasonably be
challenged, except by lack of sincerity. In such a case, no one could reasonably
ask Diotima to provide evidence to support her claim and the impertinence of
this question enhances, rather than defies, her epistemic authority on the matter.
Yet, when it comes to other psychological states or dispositions, Diotima’s
authority is less clear. If Diotima had been asked whether she was actually in love
with Arnheim and she had sincerely declared that she wasn’t, the narrator could
have easily challenged her declaration and not only on the charge of insincerity.
The narrator actually appeals to Diotima’s inexperience to account for her
blindness, and gestures at her outstanding breach of protocol, in an otherwise
very correct lady, as a symptom of a hidden motivation. Part of the lure of Musil’s
novel lies in the narrator’s ability to investigate a character’s psychological
condition beyond the latter’s own views and to intermingle the narrator’s, the
reader’s and the character’s perspective to shed some light on the latter’s
psychological condition and her capacity to lead an authentic life. In fact, the
narrator assumes that he knows better than Diotima herself what the latter’s
ultimate hopes, fears, and expectations are. Varying from case to case, it may be
more or less reasonable to challenge Diotima’s self-ascription of some mental
states and, correspondingly, ask her to provide evidence in support of her claims.
The kind of unconscious motives stipulated by psychoanalysts constitute an
extreme case in an array of ways in which an agent may keep out of sight some of
her own states and motivations.2
It seems, then, that a satisfactory account of first-person authority must take
into consideration that there is a significant number of cases where a third party
may know better than the agent herself whether she is in a certain psychological
condition. In other words, there are some cases where self-knowledge must be
regarded as an achievement, and not a trivial one. For having a certain kind of
access to one’s own psychological states may be crucial to one’s capacity to lead
one’s life.
2. Structure and Style
Richard Moran proposes a rather novel and illuminating account of how first-
person authority may be consistent with self-knowledge as an achievement. His
approach emphasizes two aspects that are neglected within the received
Cartesian model, namely: the role of practical commitment in self-knowledge as well
as the permeability of psychological dispositions to deliberation. I will argue, however,
that his approach is still trapped within the Cartesian model in some crucial
respects. To this end, I will examine Moran’s account of the kind of awareness
that may have a healing effect on an agent’s psychic health. The individuation of
such a kind of awareness is presented by Moran as a significant virtue of his
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approach and, to this purpose, he introduces a few notions such as permeability,
transparency, and avowal. I will argue however that, even if these notions go in
the right direction, they are in need of substantial modification if they are to
capture the relevant kind of awareness. I will, in part II, take advantage of
Bernard Williams’ notion of acknowledgment,3 as well as Simone Weil’s
distinction between two notions of necessity,4 in order to articulate the sort of
substantial modification that I judge to be indispensable. I will argue, more
specifically, that a certain kind of receptivity plays a crucial role in understanding
the repairing virtues of awareness, even though such receptivity may conflict in
more than one way with Moran’s fundamental distinction between the
deliberative and the theoretical attitude towards oneself.
Before closing this introduction, let me briefly motivate the philosophical style
that inspires this paper. It seems clear that philosophy has to do with the
discernment of some facti and, therefore, that a philosopher must try to get in
contact with the particular factum whose aspects she wants to discern. This
contact is only possible if she explores some paradigmatic cases, if she looks
carefully into them. Needless to say, identifying a case as paradigmatic already
involves some philosophical abilities. One may resort to the philosophical,
scientific or literary tradition to identify them. And it is already a philosophical
view that some philosophical trends have lost sight of the relevant factum, that
what they regard as paradigmatic is not.
One significant way of losing sight of the subject matter is by pressing too much
in the direction of clarity or raising questions which, even if they are well-
entrenched in the philosophical tradition, may not be relevant to the issues at hand.
In the discussion that follows, I have tried to avoid this pitfall. This paper
constitutes both a vindication of and an exercise in a philosophical style that
distrusts an excessive emphasis in principles, definitions, thought experiments, and
qualifications, but insists on looking into paradigmatic cases, drawing connections
and taking them just to the point at which they stop being illuminating.
I
First-person Authority: Deliberative versus Theoretical Attitude
3. The Akratic Gambler
Moran’s approach to first-person authority can be quite naturally presented (and
discussed) in the light of the akratic gambler’s case. Suppose that, at some point,
the akratic gambler reflects on the impact of gambling on his life and, as a result,
he decides not to gamble anymore. Yet, he soon realizes that he had previously
made similar decisions to no avail, since he ended up gambling even more
intensely than before. So, he may predict that, despite his best intentions, he will
after all keep on gambling and, as a result, he will ruin himself and his family. He
may even seek to use his decision as a barrier against his drive and, in this
respect, he will regard his own decision as a sort of countervailing force.5
First-Person Authority and Self-Knowledge as an Achievement 327
r 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
We may express what is going wrong with the akratic gambler by saying that
his psychological dispositions are not sufficiently permeable to his decisions. It
seems, then, that a certain degree of permeability is constitutive of our notion of a
healthy agent. And if, in his plight, the akratic gambler indulged in his
psychological dispositions and accepted that there is nothing that he can do with
regard to them, then he will be evading his responsibility as an agent who is
supposed to make decisions, form intentions, and, therefore, acquire some
commitments with regard to some future action. But if, on the contrary, he
neglected the strength of his psychological disposition and assumed that, by making
the appropriate decision, his life will change, then he would be prey to another
sort of evasion.6 It is a relevant aspect of an agent’s psychic health that she does
not systematically indulge in any such evasion. For no one could evade herself in
either of these two ways systematically, and still be regarded as an agent.
4. The Deliberative versus the Theoretical Attitude
Following up on Moran, we could thus claim that agency is placed in the interplay
between a deliberative and a theoretical attitude towards him or herself.7 The
deliberative attitude is involved in the gambler’s capacity to decide not to
gamble again, while he adopts the theoretical attitude when he contemplates his
psychological dispositions and predicts that he will gamble again.
Self-ascriptions based on a deliberative attitude seem to be endowed with first-
person authority. No evidence needs to be provided on the agent’s side and,
relatedly, she needn’t look into her behavior in order to find out what she has
finally decided or the intention she has finally formed. Here the asymmetry with
a third party is manifest. For the latter has to rely on the agent’s behavior
(including her self-ascriptions) to know what the agent’s intentions are.
By contrast, self-ascriptions on the basis of a theoretical attitude upon oneself
do not seem to possess the kind of first-person authority we are trying to grasp at
this stage. For, obviously, the agent must look for evidence in order to make the
appropriate statements of fact and, consequently, she could legitimately be asked
to support her claims on some evidence. Moreover, quite often the agent is not in
a better position than a third party to gather the relevant evidence to make that
kind of ascription.
In this respect, we could only establish that the agent has a privileged
theoretical situation if we assumed that the evidence to be gathered is
fundamentally concerned with events and states to which only the agent has a
direct access. Independently of whether one could coherently fix the content of
such states and events,8 we can hardly take this Cartesian assumption as the
starting point, the raw material, of our reflection about self-knowledge. For much
of its attraction derives from a rather complex philosophical position, namely: the
foundationalist attempt to answer skeptical arguments.9 In any case, Moran
points to a second worry that this approach, and any theoretical view about self-
knowledge, must confront, namely: that theoretical access to oneself is not first-
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personal enough.10 For, within such a perspective, one regards one’s own
thoughts and sensations as a mere passing show, as not involving any sort of
commitment on the agent’s side.11 One observes and describes one’s own
thoughts and emotions with the same attitude as one could observe and describe
someone else’s.
According to Moran, the lack of first-person authority and the fact that
theoretical self-knowledge is not first-personal enough are closely interlocked: it
is because theoretical self-knowledge is not first-personal enough that the agent
lacks first-person authority with regard to the facts thus discovered. On his
approach, an agent’s authority involves two aspects. An agent has, first of all, the
authority to commit herself to perform a certain action by forming an intention or
by making a decision.12 And it is in virtue of the agent having this sort of, say,
practical authority that she is endowed with epistemic authority with regard to her
self-ascriptions of intentions or decisions. This connection must be regarded as a
conceptual one. For it is difficult to imagine a situation where a certain agent is
deprived of epistemic authority about certain kinds of intentions and decisions,
and we still endow her with the corresponding practical authority.
In any case, Moran introduces the notion of permeability to understand what
that interplay may amount to: an agent’s psychological dispositions and states must be
to some degree permeable to the results of her deliberations. A minimal degree of
permeability is required to be an agent at all, while falling below a certain degree
of permeability is a criterion of psychic impairment. In the next section, I will
present some other concepts that Moran introduces in order to explore the
phenomenon of permeability. I regard this phenomenon as crucial, but I will
argue that a proper understanding of it will ultimately lead us to (a) revise the
role that Moran attributes to the theoretical attitude in an agent’s life, (b)
vindicate the role of a specific sort of perception or receptivity as being relevantly
first-personal. All this will (c) improve our understanding of what is involved in
the deliberative attitude and the kind of awareness that may have a healing
effect.
5. The Transparency Condition
In his Introductory Lectures to Psychoanalysis, Freud begins his presentation of a
general theory of neurosis with the case of a high-class married lady, who we
might call Frau Bruggen, whose neurotic symptoms he regards as a displacement
of a monstrous passion: her being in love with her son-in-law. As Freud himself
puts it:
She herself was intensely in love with a young man, with the same son-
in-law who had persuaded her to come to me as a patient. She herself
knew nothing, or perhaps only a very little, of this love; in the family
relationship that existed between them it was easy for this passionate
liking to disguise itself as innocent affection. After all our experiences
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elsewhere, it is not hard for us to feel our way into the mental life of this
upright wife and worthy mother, of the age of fifty-three. Being in love
like this, as a monstrous and impossible thing, could not become
conscious; but it remained in existence and, even though it was
unconscious, it exercised a severe pressure. Something had to become
of it, some relief had to be looked for; and the easiest mitigation was
offered, no doubt, by the mechanism of displacement which plays a part
so regularly in the generating of delusional jealousy. If not only were she,
the old woman, in love with a young man, but if also her old husband
were having a love affair with a young girl, then her conscience would be
relieved of the weight of her unfaithfulness. The phantasy of her
husband’s unfaithfulness thus acted as a cooling compress on her
burning wound. (Freud 1973: 291)
We have here a case where blindness towards the nature of one’s own experience
and, more precisely, the experience of being in love, gives rise to some neurotic
symptoms which psychoanalytic treatment is meant to heal by bringing it to the
patient’s consciousness. Part of the problem lies in specifying the kind of awareness
that may have such a healing effect; for some sorts of awareness are not only useless,
but standardly interpreted as a resistance on the agent’s side. Moran’s notion of
avowal certainly seeks to shed some light on the kind of awareness that may
contribute to restoring the patient’s psychic health. I will argue, however, that,
even if the notion of avowal is illuminating in many respects, it is ultimately
inadequate because it is trapped within Moran’s distinction between the
deliberative and the theoretical attitudes.13
To introduce his notion of avowal, Moran invites us to consider how an agent’s
answer to the question:
(a) ‘Do I believe that P?’
may relate to her answer to the question:
(b) ‘Is P true?’
Even if these two questions are not equivalent, it seems that, at least in the
standard case, the agent must answer both questions in the same way. This
implies that, in such cases, the agent should not answer (a) by looking on her
inner theatre to see whether she has a certain belief, but by deliberating about
what the right answer to question (b) might be. In so doing, she must explore the
world in order to determine whether P is true. Hence, the fact that (a) and (b)
satisfy a Transparency Condition (i.e. that they are transparent to one another
insofar as the agent must answer (a) ‘. . . by reference to (or consideration of) the
same reasons that would justify an answer to the corresponding question about
the world’)14 implies that (a) is construed as a deliberative question and,
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consequently, that, in raising that question, the agent is adopting a deliberative
attitude towards herself.
The Transparency Condition, as it stands, highlights a conceptual connection
between (a) and (b), whenever the former is raised in a deliberative manner. We
may thus say that this condition is trivial, since it only requires on the agent’s side
that she should be able to adopt a deliberative attitude towards (a). And even
Frau Bruggen, impaired as she is, has no trouble in adopting such an attitude
towards the question ‘Do I believe that my husband has betrayed me?’. For her
negative answer to the question was the result of a process of deliberation guided
by the same reasons that led her to answer the corresponding (b)-question (i.e. ‘Is
it true that my husband has betrayed me?’) in a certain way and, as a result, the
Transparency Condition is met.
There are, however, some other situations where (a) should rather be
interpreted in a theoretical manner; think, for instance, of those situations where
there is a mismatch between what the agent sincerely claims to believe and what
her behavioral dispositions may reveal she is believing.15 Frau Bruggen may be
convinced that her husband has not betrayed her and, nevertheless, her obsessive
behavior still manifests that there is a relevant sense in which she keeps on
believing that her husband has betrayed her. To determine whether this believing
persists, question (a) should be raised from a theoretical perspective:
(an) Is ‘believing P’ among my behavioral dispositions?
It is easy to see that, in this case, the fact that question-(an) is transparent to
question-(b) is no longer a trivial matter for the agent, but comes up as a
significant achievement, as Moran himself highlights:16
There are, however, other possible situations calling for a different
perspective on oneself, and from the stance of an empirical spectator one
may answer the question of what one believes in a way that makes no
essential reference to the truth of the belief, but is treated as a more or
less purely psychological question about a certain person, as one may
inquire into the beliefs of someone else. If I have reason to believe that
some attitude of mine is not ‘up to me’ in this sense, that is, for example,
some anger or fear persisting independently of my sense of any reasons
supporting it, then I cannot take the question regarding my attitude to be
transparent to a corresponding question regarding what it is directed
upon. Transparency in such situations is more of an achievement than
something with a logical guarantee. (Moran 2001: 67)
Moran often stresses that an agent’s psychological states and attitudes must be
responsive (or permeable) to the result of her practical deliberations. And this is a
conceptual constraint that comes in different degrees. A minimal degree of
responsiveness is required to individuate a human being as an agent at all,
whereas a higher degree may be demanded to recognize such an agent as rational
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or healthy. This conceptual constraint is, nevertheless, consistent, as Moran
himself remarks, with rather specific mismatches between the outcome of one’s
deliberations and one’s actual psychological dispositions, as happens in Frau
Bruggen’s and the akratic gambler’s case. And, in those circumstances, making
one’s psychological dispositions transparent to one’s deliberations comes as a
significant achievement, as a criterion of one’s recovery.
Moran takes for granted, however, that a single Transparency Condition is at
stake in the two situations we have examined so far, namely: one in which the
agent is simply asked to adopt a deliberative attitude towards (a), and another in
which she is required to render her psychological dispositions permeable to her
answer to question (b). Yet, it is hard to see how these two demands could be
equivalent, since the former is trivially satisfied by any human being that could
be identified as an agent at all, whereas only healthy agents may meet the latter to
a relevant degree. Moreover, we can only make sense of Frau Bruggen’s
predicament (and also of that of the akratic gambler, although in the latter case
some modifications are required in order to adapt the transparency condition to
intentions and decisions, which undoubtedly form a part of the deliberative
attitude) if we assume that she fulfills the trivial requirement, but fails to meet the
more demanding one. We know that, in the light of evidence, Frau Bruggen came
to believe that her husband has not betrayed her, whereby we may say that, in
acquiring such a commitment, she has raised the relevant (a)-question as
transparent to the corresponding (b)-question, since her response to either
question was motivated by the same reasons. So, we may say that she satisfies the
following constraint:
The Trivial Condition of Transparency: the answer to question ‘Do I believe that
P?’ is transparent to the question ‘Is P true?’ if and only if the former question is
answered by the same reasons that would justify an answer to the latter.
This is, in fact, the only constraint that Moran explicitly mentions as a condition
for transparency. Frau Bruggen’s obsessive behavior constitutes, though, a
standard psychoanalytic case and, therefore, we must interpret her predicament
as one in which those beliefs of hers which satisfy this trivial condition of
transparency are, nevertheless, in conflict with what her obsessive behavior
reveals she keeps on believing. To put it another way, Moran should just say that
Frau Bruggen’s psychological dispositions are not sufficiently permeable to the
beliefs she is (trivially) committed to. To increase such permeability
and, therefore, render Frau Bruggen’s psychological dispositions transparent to
her answer to question (b), will certainly count as an achievement, as a criterion of
her recovery. So, a second, deeper, condition of transparency seems to be in place:
The Deeper Condition of Transparency: the answer to the question ‘Is ‘‘believing
that P’’ among my behavioral dispositions?’ is transparent to the question ‘Is P
true?’ if and only if the behavioral dispositions relevant to my believing that P are
permeable to the reasons that would justify an answer to the latter question.
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This condition of transparency is certainly parasitic upon the trivial one: only
agents whose beliefs are transparent in the trivial sense may aim at satisfying the
deeper condition. And this is what Frau Bruggen (and the akratic gambler) fail to
do. So, it seems that, if we are to describe Frau Bruggen’s (and the akratic
gambler’s) plight in terms of Moran’s Transparency Condition, we are forced
to differentiate two conditions of transparency: a trivial and a deeper one.
I will further object, however, that the distinction between these two conditions
of transparency (as well as the corresponding notions of avowal) is insufficient
to characterize the goal of psychoanalytic treatment unless Moran’s approach
is repaired in a rather significant way. To see this, let us first show how
the ambiguity in the transparency condition expands into Moran’s notion of
avowal.
6. Avowals and The Goal of Psychoanalytic Treatment
6.1 The Ambiguity of Avowals
Frau Bruggen asked herself whether she had been betrayed by her husband. She
examined the relevant facts, she concluded that she hadn’t and she, thereby,
acquired a certain belief; insofar as that belief is the result of a proper
examination of the relevant facts, we may say that it satisfies the trivial condition
of transparency or, in Moran’s terms, the Transparency Condition tout court.
Whenever she might decide to declare her belief, her declaration will thereby
count as an avowal:
The notion of avowal has been developed here in relation to the earlier
idea of transparency. A statement of one’s belief about X is said to obey
the Transparency Condition when the statement is made by considera-
tion of the facts about X itself, and not by either an ‘inward glance’ or by
observation of one’s own behavior. An avowal is a statement of one’s
belief which obeys the Transparency Condition. (Moran 2001: 101)17
We may regard this notion of avowal as trivial insofar as it just requires that the
agent’s declaration should be trivially transparent. We know that, despite Frau
Bruggen’s grounded conviction that her husband has not betrayed her, she
actually displays a pattern of behavior that suggests that she still keeps on
believing that her husband has betrayed her. Someone may suggest this to her
and she may accept, in the light of some evidence, that her believing that her
husband has betrayed her still forms a part of her behavioral dispositions. And,
nevertheless, the acceptance of such a fact about herself will not entitle her to
(trivially) avow that her husband has betrayed her because such a belief does not
satisfy the trivial condition of transparency:
The rationality of her response requires that she be in a position to avow
her attitude toward him, and not just describe or report on it, however
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accurately, for it is only from the position of avowal that she is
necessarily acknowledging facts about him as internally relevant to
that attitude (say, as justifying or undermining it), and thereby (also)
as relevant to the fully empirical question of whether it remains true that
she indeed has this sense of being betrayed by him. (Moran 2001: 93)
The mismatch between what an agent may trivially avow and her beliefs as they
are displayed by her behavioral dispositions, led us to introduce the deeper
condition of transparency. We may, then, propose a corresponding notion of
avowal, namely: an agent deeply avows her beliefs whenever the latter are deeply
transparent. The question now is how this deeper notion of avowal may help us to
understand psychoanalytic practices. I will argue that this notion, as it stands,
cannot coherently characterize the goal of such practices; for a second direction of
permeability is actually needed. Moran insists that our psychological dispositions
should be permeable to our decisions and deliberations; my point is that we must
also make sense of the idea that our decisions and deliberations should be
permeable to our psychological dispositions if we want to appropriately
characterize the kind of awareness that may have healing effects. In particular,
I will try to grasp this second aspect by exploring a certain way in which an agent
may be passive, which crucially contrasts with the way in which the akratic
gambler or Frau Bruggen are passive as they indulge in their respective obsessive
behavior. My worry will then be that this notion is inconsistent with the relevance
attached, within Moran’s approach, to the distinction between the deliberative
and the theoretical attitudes.
In a first approximation, we could say that a psychoanalyst treats unconscious
motives as motives that are impervious to the agent’s commitments. And, as a
result, we may initially think that the goal of treatment consists of rendering a
patient’s psychological attitude permeable to her own commitments. Psycho-
analysts seem to assume that at least one means by which this goal can be
achieved is by rendering their patient aware of her initially unconscious desires.
It is clear that the kind of awareness required cannot be reduced to a statement of
fact about the unconscious desire that supposedly accounts for the obsessive
pattern of behavior. Nobody doubts nowadays that Frau Bruggen could not be
cured by just accepting, in the light of evidence, that she was in love with her son-
in-law. The kind of awareness that she should have of that fact must certainly go
beyond that sort of acceptance.
A relevant novelty in Moran’s approach lies in his attempt to offer an
appropriate characterization of the kind of awareness involved in such cases. He
certainly uses the notion of avowal to characterize the goal of psychoanalytic
treatment and, even if he does not differentiate between two kinds of avowals, it
should be clear by now that, in cases of psychic impairment, it is the deep kind of
avowal that really matters. So, it seems that the most satisfactory way in which
we could characterize the goal of psychoanalytic therapy within Moran’s
approach, should go like this: psychoanalytic treatment aims at transforming the
patient in such a way that she could deeply avow her psychological condition. I will
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argue, however, that this characterization is crucially unsatisfactory, mainly due
to how Moran conceives of the distinction between the deliberative and the
theoretical attitudes.
6.2 The Goal of Psychoanalytic Treatment
Psychoanalytic therapy assumes, as we may put it, that the agent’s incapacity to
satisfy the deeper condition of transparency is caused by the interference of some
repressed desire. And, according to Moran, psychic health will be restored when
the Transparency Condition (which, if I am right, should be construed as being
concerned with the deeper variety) is satisfied:
This goal of treatment, however, requires that the attitude in question is
knowable by the person, not through a process of theoretical self-
interpretation but by avowal of how one thinks and feels. That is, what is
to be restored to the person is not just knowledge of the facts about
oneself, but self-knowledge that obeys the condition of transparency.
(Moran 2001: 90)
However, which is the feeling or thought that the agent is supposed to
deeply avow whenever the psychoanalytic treatment succeeds? It seems that,
according to Moran, the feeling or thought at stake should be the repressed,
unconscious, one. For the previously quoted text is preceded by the following
remark:
But any such suggestion would neglect, at the very last, the crucial
therapeutic difference between the merely ‘intellectual’ acceptance of an
interpretation, which will itself normally be seen as a form of resistance,
and the process of working-through that leads to a fully internalized
acknowledgement of some attitude which makes a felt difference to the
rest of the analysand’s mental life. (Moran 2001: 89)
The symptom is, as we know, that Frau Bruggen cannot deeply avow that her
husband has not betrayed her, and the stipulated cause is her being
unconsciously in love with her son-in-law. Psychoanalytic therapy assumes that
by bringing unconscious desire to consciousness the symptom will vanish. The
issue is what kind of awareness of the repressed desire is required for the
symptom to disappear? It does not reduce to recognizing, in the light of evidence,
that she has such a monstrous desire. For that statement involves the sort of
distance with regard to oneself that is specific to the theoretical attitude and, as a
result, such a statement would not be first-personal enough. So, in order to avow
her love for her son-in-law, she should shift to a deliberative attitude towards it.
Her avowal should be the result of her deliberation about whether she ought to
have such a desire, that is, whether a certain relation with her son-in-law is
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worth-desiring. Regarding desires, Moran presents the Transparency Condition
as being concerned with the relation between:
(c) ‘Do I desire that P?’
and
(d) ‘Is P worth-desiring?’18
So, it seems then that, if Frau Bruggen were to avow her love for her son-in-law,
this could only be done after a proper examination of the question ‘Is a loving
relation to my son-in-law worth-desiring?’. Only after an affirmative answer to
this question, could she avow that she is in love with her son-in-law. This avowal
might still be of the trivial kind, since it may just accidentally coincide with Frau
Bruggen’s dispositions toward her son-in-law; and the deeper condition of
transparency requires that such a disposition should be permeable (and,
therefore, sensitive and not merely coincidental) to whatever conclusion she
might have reached. But how could that permeability be reached? There is no
hint in Moran’s approach about how such permeability could be increased.
Psychoanalytic therapy is supposed to help us in this respect, but a detailed
characterization of that practice within Moran’s approach leaves us in the dark.
Even if Frau Bruggen might trivially avow her initially unconscious desire, and
not just recognize its existence in the light of behavioral evidence, nonetheless we
still do not know how such a commitment may benefit the real goal, namely:
that her psychological dispositions should become more permeable to her
decisions, beliefs, and intentions, that is, that Frau Bruggen should satisfy the
deeper condition of transparency with regard to her belief ‘My husband has not
betrayed me’.
Moreover, it is unclear how Frau Bruggen could even trivially avow that she is
in love with her son-in-law. For, on the psychoanalytic theory, it was precisely the
conflict between this desire and her moral outlook what led the former to
repression. How could she later on conclude that such a desire is not horrendous,
but worth pursuing? Only if she would modify her moral outlook, but why
should she? Why should she think that there is something wrong with her moral
outlook? Why not just accept her bad luck, the existence of an insurmountable
conflict between her desires and the moral demands? It is clear that she could
only recover her psychic health by means of a certain kind of awareness, if we
could make sense of the idea that she should revise her moral outlook in the light
of the fact that she has some strong desire; for repression of such a desire has
turned out to be of no avail. In other words, we need to make sense of the idea that an
agent’s deliberation should be permeable to her actual dispositions, and not only the other
way round. Moran has rightly stressed that our psychological dispositions should
be permeable to our decisions and commitments. Now, I am stressing that Frau
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Bruggen could only overcome her impairment if we could make sense of
permeability in the complementary direction.19
But how can we make sense of this second direction of permeability? In the
following sections, I will explore this second direction of permeability in the light
of Bernard Williams’ notion of ‘acknowledgement’ and Simone Weil’s distinction
between two notions of necessity; and argue why I think Moran’s approach
cannot make sense of it.
II
Acknowledgment and Self-Knowledge as an Achievement
7. The Notion of Acknowledgment
Bernard Williams explores the notion of acknowledgment in an attempt to
articulate a reasonable view about what may count as an authentic life:
A relevant notion here is acknowledgement. Someone may come to
acknowledge a certain affiliation as an identity, and this is neither a mere
discovery nor, certainly, a mere decision. It is as though he were forced to
recognize the authority of this identity as giving a structure and a focus
to his life and his outlook. There are circumstances in which what was
earlier a mere recognition of fact may come to compel acknowledgement, as
when many assimilationist Jews in the 1930s came to acknowledge a
Jewish and perhaps a Zionist identity under the thought that there was
no way in which without evasion they could go on as though it made no
difference that they were Jewish people. (Williams 2002: 203; my
emphasis)
This notion of acknowledgement is closely related to Moran’s characterization of
the kind of awareness that may have healing effects. Moran himself employs the
phrase ‘full acknowledgment’ to describe the kind of awareness that may have
such effects; he talks in a previous quotation about ‘a fully internalized
acknowledgement of some attitude which makes a felt difference to the rest of the
analysand’s mental life’ (Moran 2001: 89; my emphasis). I have argued however
that, in cases of psychic impairment, a double direction of permeability is required
to reach that ‘fully internalized acknowledgement’. My worry is, as we shall see,
that Moran’s insistence on the distinction between the deliberative and the
theoretical attitudes leaves no room for the second direction of permeability. I will
argue, by contrast, that Williams’ notion of acknowledgment has no such
limitations, and may help us to understand how permeability may go both ways.
In a first approximation, we may say that Williams’ notion of acknowledgment
is placed in a middle ground between discovery and decision or, in Moran’s terms,
between the deliverances of the theoretical and the deliberative attitudes. Like
the latter, an acknowledgment must include some sort of practical commitment
and, like the former, it must include the discovery of some facts about oneself:
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Drawn to bind myself to other’s shared values, to make my own beliefs
and feelings steadier (to make them, at the limit, for the first time into
beliefs); I become what with increasing steadiness I can sincerely profess;
I become what I have sincerely declared to them, or perhaps I become my
interpretation of their interpretation of what I have sincerely declared to
them. The sense that I am contributing to this, that it is a project, fills out
the idea that acknowledgement is more than mere factual discovery,
while at the same time the sense that there is discovery involved is
related to the need to resist fantasy in making sense of my beliefs and
allegiances in this way. (Williams 2002: 204)
I see no way, within Moran’s approach, in which decision and discovery could
come together within a single attitude. For these two elements have been used to
identify two exclusive attitudes. Yet, Moran’s notion of permeability may, after
proper elaboration, help us to make sense of this middle ground. Let us begin
with the constraints that our psychological conditions impose upon what an
agent may acknowledge.
The importance of resisting fantasy may be illustrated by the plight of the
akratic gambler. Someone who was convinced that just by deciding to form an
intention (or to engage in a project) they will be able to carry it out, would be
indulging in a certain kind of evasion, namely: the same one as an akratic
gambler who, oblivious of his psychological dispositions, assumed that, given his
decision, he will not gamble any more. Insofar as, in acknowledgment, there is a
point of hope or prediction that one will be able to keep faithful to a certain
identification, it seems relevant that the agent should avoid, to some degree,
distortion and fantasy. In this sense, a commitment that did not take sufficiently
into consideration the agent’s psychological condition could hardly be identified
as an acknowledgment. And, on the contrary, a statement of fact about one’s own
psychological condition that was deprived of any practical identification, could
not be presented as an acknowledgment at all.20
It is clear, then, that acknowledgment comes up as an achievement, both epistemic
and practical. For the agent can fail both ways: either by failing to resist fantasy or
by being unable to keep faithful to a certain commitment. Needless to say,
Williams’ main point is that both failures are inextricably interrelated: our
psychological dispositions must be permeable to our commitments to some
degree, but if our commitments are not sufficiently permeable to our
psychological reality, we are bound to fail in our attempt to honor the former.
An important consequence of this double permeability is that our psychological
dispositions do not constitute a determinate set of beliefs or desires in the light of
which to form certain intentions, but are shaped by such commitments and,
inversely, the notion of acknowledgment invites us to shape our commitments in
the light of some sense of our psychological reality.21 Now it is not hard to see
why this notion of acknowledgment should be regarded as specifically first-
personal.
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Diotima’s knowledge of her intention to invite Arnheim was presented, at the
outset, as a paradigmatic case of first-person authority, a striking feature of which
was that she needn’t look for evidence to ascertain what her intention was. And
lack of evidence, far from diminishing her authority, seemed to enhance it. Yet,
we did not reduce the specificity of self-knowledge to this peculiarity, since there
are other cases in which self-knowledge comes as an achievement, as would be
the case if Diotima became in a certain manner aware of the fact that she was in
love with Arnheim, or Frau Bruggen recognized in a similar way the
corresponding feeling for her son-in-law. We need, then, to identify the kind of
awareness that would make us regard such an achievement as specifically first-
personal. We appear to have a clear idea of when it is not—for instance, when
either Diotima or Frau Bruggen came to know about their feelings just in the light
of evidence, as someone else could have done. So, what else is required? Moran
suggests that they should avow such feelings. Such an avowal involves, in its
trivial version, just a practical commitment that comes with some epistemic
immediacy which dispenses with the need for the agent to look for evidence in
order to determine whether she has actually acquired such a commitment. Moran
insists, however, that, in cases of psychic impairment, the avowal at stake should
come as an achievement and, therefore, what is required for them is something
more profound, ‘a fully internalized acknowledgement’ of their feelings or, to put
it another way, that they should deeply avow such feelings. And, as they may
acquire such a commitment, we will have a practical commitment, but they will
be prey to the sort of epistemic uncertainty that Williams was so keen to bring
out.22 And this is what should happen in the significant cases of acknowl-
edgment. In fact, we might use such a notion to characterize a continuum which
goes from trivial cases of acknowledgment, like Diotima’s intention to invite
Arnheim, to more problematic ones, like the acknowledgment of one’s identities
or one’s feelings of love.
Should we, nevertheless, conclude that acknowledgment is strictly first-
personal only when no epistemic uncertainty is present? Wouldn’t this attitude
confuse a Cartesian elucidation of self-knowledge with the raw material we are
suppose to account for? It seems that a good account of self-knowledge should
allow for epistemic immediacy whenever it is relevant (like in the trivial cases of
acknowledgment or commitment), and retain other specifically first-personal
features whenever it is not (like in the deeper, and more complex, ones). Among
such features, I have mentioned the capacity to practical commitment, as
opposed to regarding one’s life as a passing show, as well as the capacity to shape
one’s psychological condition in the light of such commitments, and vice versa.
The notion of acknowledgment seems to satisfy them all. Some may, never-
theless, object that the notion of acknowledgment cannot avoid the risk of
perceiving one’s life as a passing show, since an agent’s acknowledgements
derive from some discoveries about herself and, so far, it seems that they should
be the outcome of a theoretical attitude, which, as we know, is not specifically
first-personal, since it involves looking at oneself in a detached manner. To
address this issue, let us introduce the notion of ‘receptive passivity’.
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8. ‘Being Forced to’
So far, I have been examining the notion of acknowledgment in the light of the
distinction between discovery and decision, which, even if it is alien to the kind
of unity required, emphasizes the need to bring together some features that are
traditionally regarded as incompatible. Williams mentions, however, another
concept which may shed a more unifying light on the notion of acknowledgment,
namely, a certain way of ‘being forced to’:
It is as though he were forced to recognize the authority of this identity as
giving a structure and a focus to his life and his outlook. (Williams 2002:
203; my emphasis)
Even if Williams has explored some related notions in previous writings, he does
not say much, in Truth and Truthfulness, about what is involved in this kind of
necessity, in this ‘being forced to’.23 Some light may be shed on this notion,
though, by examining Simone Weil’s distinction between two notions of necessity
(and the corresponding notions of obedience):
Obedience. There are two kinds. We can obey the force of gravity or we
can obey the relationship of things. In the first case we do what we are
driven to by the imagination which fills up empty spaces. We can affix a
variety of labels to it, often with a show of truth, including righteousness
and God. If we suspend the filling up activity of the imagination and fix
our attention on the relationship of things, a necessity becomes apparent
which we cannot help obeying. Until then we have not any notion of
necessity and we have no sense of obedience. (Weil 1963: 43)
The first kind of necessity is associated with the sort of necessity that is involved
in gravitational forces. Agents are subject to some psychological laws in the same
way as bodies are subject to gravity. Weil might, thus, say that the fact the akratic
gambler keeps on gambling, despite his decision on the contrary, is an effect of
gravity upon his soul. In a more common language, we could say that the akratic
gambler yields to his passion as a result of some psychological laws acting upon
him, in the same way as the rock may roll down the slope as the result of
gravitational forces impinging upon it. And something similar goes for Frau
Bruggen’s incapacity to get rid of her obsessive behavior. We have no room in this
paper to detail the laws that, according to Weil, govern the human soul when it is
subject to the order of gravity. Let me just mention that her reflections on this
matter were deeply affected by the ascension to power of the Nazis in Germany,
the Spanish Civil War, and the beginning of the Second World War. She regarded
these events as the effects of force upon the human soul. Her notion of force (not
be confused with Williams’ concept of ‘being forced to’) is a predecessor of her
concept of gravity and was introduced to account for what she took to be the core
of The Iliad (cf. Weil 1986). A central negative claim in her approach is that the
effort of the will is counterproductive to getting rid of gravity. So, she looks
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elsewhere for a strategy that might diminish the devastating effects of force, of
gravity, upon human beings, which might counteract our disposition to harm
each other, as it was dramatically disclosed by the aforementioned historical
events. I see in the following quotation the core of her alternative proposal, which
I will elaborate in the coming sections:
Action is the pointer of the balance. We must not touch the pointer but
the weight.
Exactly the same rule applies to opinions. (Weil 1963: 44)
The weights in the balance represent the agent’s motivations. If one wished to
modify the course of her action by the effort of the will, one would be in a
position similar to that of someone who wished to change the direction of the
pointer by holding it with their fingers. As soon as they get tired and let it go, the
pointer goes, after some pendulum motions, back to the initial position and, as a
result, no stable change in the agent’s course of action takes place. Weil assumes,
in this line of reasoning, that the agent’s motivations are rather impervious to the
effort of the will, at least in some morally relevant cases. We may use this picture
to describe the plight of both the akratic gambler and Frau Bruggen. The akratic
gambler could hold the pointer of the balance in a direction away from gambling
for a while, but his psychological dispositions, his weights, will end up
orientating the course of his action in the direction that he meant to avoid. Frau
Bruggen could repress her being in love with her son-in-law, but this will
inexorably give rise to some neurotic behavior which the effort of the will could
keep under control only for a while. The question is, then, how can the
psychological dispositions that are impervious to the agent’s decisions (and will)
become permeable? Is there any attitude that Frau Bruggen might adopt to
increase this kind of permeability, so that she may end up being able to deeply
avow that she has not been betrayed by her husband? To this purpose, let us
now turn to the second notion of necessity that appears in Weil’s initial quotation.
Necessity in this second sense has to do with a certain kind of passivity, which,
as I will argue, is alien to the sort of passivity that is involved in the akratic
gambler yielding to his passion or Frau Bruggen indulging in her obsessive
behavior.
9. Receptive Passivity and Double Permeability
Despite Moran’s effort to distance himself from the Cartesian model of self-
knowledge, I am convinced that his approach still shares a fundamental
assumption with that model, namely, a certain view about the role that passivity
and activity should play in an agent’s life. Within the Cartesian model, an agent is
passive when she yields to passions, or when she contemplates her psychological
dispositions and states them from a theoretical perspective; whereas she is active
when she forms an intention, makes a decision, and seeks to carry it out despite
the strength of her passions. A certain conception of what constitutes an agent’s
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true self lies at the bottom of this way of drawing the distinction between
passivity and activity in the life of an agent: I am faithful to my true self whenever I
act in the light of reason, whereas, by yielding to passions, I am alienated from it.24 This
conception of the true self shows in Descartes’ conception of error as deriving
from weakness of the will, and not from any specific limits in human
understanding;25 but also, and more emblematically, in Kant’s conception of
moral agents as rational beings who are supposed to keep their natural
inclinations at bay and act solely for the sake of reason and, in the end, of
duty.26 And it will become apparent, in the coming sections, how this contrast
between the true self and what is alienated from it, is also involved in Moran’s
distinction between a deliberative and a theoretical attitude towards oneself. To
this purpose, I will sketch a different way in which an agent may be passive
which, far from degrading her, plays a crucial role in her development and
flourishing. I will emphasize that being passive in such a way should not be
confused with adopting a theoretical attitude towards oneself, since being
passive in that way is involved in any sort of deliberation, including
mathematical demonstration. I will, finally, show how a proper cultivation of
the proposed kind of passivity may certainly help someone to recover their
psychic health and, in general, increase their capacity to lead a life that may make
sense. I am, nevertheless, rather reluctant to claim that such a passivity should
belong to one’s true self, since it is part of my alternative approach that we cannot
make sense of a clear-cut distinction between what constitutes one’s true self and
what should be alienated from it. And the denial of such a clear divide will be
relevant to understanding why a certain kind of passivity lies at the core of the
kind of awareness that may have a healing effect.
The notion of passivity I am trying to articulate has to do with Weil’s second
notion of necessity:
If we suspend the filling up activity of the imagination and fix our
attention on the relationship of things, a necessity becomes apparent which
we cannot help obeying. Until then we have not any notion of necessity and
we have no sense of obedience. (Weil 1963: 43; my emphasis)
This notion of necessity, this ‘we cannot help obeying’, is certainly connected to
Williams’ experience of ‘being forced to’, and points to a certain kind of passivity:
To act not for an object but from a necessity. I cannot do otherwise. It is not
an action but a sort of passivity. Inactive action. (Weil 1963: 39)
What kind of passivity could this be? Think, for instance, of the sense in which an
agent is passive when she follows a mathematical demonstration and accepts its
conclusion; or when she modifies her perceptual beliefs in the light of the
changes that take place in her environment (for instance, if she lifted up her
keyboard, she could not longer believe that her keyboard was on the desk). This
sort of passivity is similar to the passivity of a dancer as she lets herself follow a
piece of music, or that of an actress, who after assimilating the mentality of a
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character, lets herself flow during the performance. In all these cases, an order,
a sort of necessity, is imposed upon the agent, but that imposition (as opposed to
what happens with the strength of passion for the akratic gambler) does not
oppress or enslave her, but contributes to her expansion and flourishing. For an
agent’s life is, at least prima facie, enriched by understanding a mathematical
demonstration, by tracking what is going on in her surroundings, by letting her
body dance a melody or by playing a character. We may regard all such actions as
creative for the agent. This idea may sound a bit too vague and strange and,
nevertheless, we have first approached both the akratic gambler and Frau
Bruggen as agents who confronted a certain kind of predicament, namely: they
degraded themselves by their inability to resist a certain temptation. Correspond-
ingly, we may think that some other actions and attitudes may not degrade the
self, but contribute to its development and flourishing. We may, then, talk about
such actions and attitudes as being creative for the self. And this notion might be,
for now, as vague as the notion of degradation that we have so far taken for
granted, and such that provides us with a prima facie access to the kind of
predicament that the akratic gambler and Frau Bruggen may confront. In a
similar vein, let us grant that we have a prima facie apprehension of the idea of
‘being creative for the self’, both by contrast with the idea of degradation and by
appeal to experiences such as following a mathematical demonstration, and see
whether the discussion to come may shed further light on how such creativity is
at all possible and what kind of attitude may favor it.
In this respect, it is important to distinguish low and receptive passivity. Both
sorts of passivity involve necessity, but the kind of necessity at stake in each case
is of a rather different nature; or this is, at least, the view that I shall defend. Low
passivity is the kind of passivity that the Cartesian Model ascribes to passions
and it is low because, by yielding to them, the agent degrades herself. The locus of
this kind of passivity is, as we have seen, a conception of the self that
distinguishes between those aspects of it which the self truly identifies with and
those others that are alienated from it. Within this model, all passions are low
because they belong to the alienated self; for, no matter whether any such passion
may eventually coincide with the dictates of reason, this coincidence tends to be
regarded as merely accidental, since there is always the threat that the strength of
any given passion might, at some stage, lead us away from reason. Within this
model, low passions constitute a system of forces that the true self must make every effort
to keep under control. The sort of necessity involved in low passions is, as we see,
similar to those of gravitational or physical forces, and with regard to them the
true self may have two fundamental attitudes: either to resist or to yield. Moran
rightly stresses that the passions of a healthy agent are, to some degree,
permeable to her decisions and deliberations. Yet, if passions constitute a system
of forces, it is difficult to understand how something that it is not itself a passion
could alter a passion. This is an issue which I shall not pursue in this paper, but
which brings out a further tension between the notion of passion associated with
a clear-cut divide between the true and the alienated self, on the one hand; and
the need to make sense of Moran’s notion of permeability, on the other.
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In contrast with low passivity, the kind of necessity involved in receptive
passivity has primarily to do with the way the self relates to a certain order, and only
derivatively with what may structure the elements that may constitute such an
order. Low passivity presupposes a system of forces whose impact the self has to
resist and is constantly tempted to yield to. This impact on the self is supposed to
be subject to the same kind of necessity that unites the different forces within the
system. Relatedly, we may say that the system is blind insofar as it is not affected
by the way the self may conceive of it and this is why it is so hard to understand
how a certain decision that one might make, could affect that order. By contrast,
the kind of imposition or impact that the order grasped by receptive passivity has
on the self is not blind, since, among other things, it depends on the capacity to
perceive such an order. A different issue is what brings together the elements that
are perceived by the self, and this may vary from one case to another. That order
will not be the same if what is grasped is a mathematical demonstration, the
movement of an object, or the melody in a piece of music. The point is that the
sort of imposition (and, thereby, of necessity) that an agent experiences by being
passively receptive, has properties that are alien to the kind of necessity involved
in low passions, namely: it is receptive (i.e. tracks an order) and creative (i.e. the
agent is enriched by the experience of following the order that is external to her).
That is why we may call it ‘receptive passivity’: passive, insofar as it involves some
sort of imposition, and receptive, to qualify the kind of imposition that it is.27
Both receptivity and creativity seems to be present in Weil’s invitation to expose
ourselves to some morally disturbing situations, so that, by paying attention to
their moral aspects, we might increase our moral sensitivity and, thereby, enlarge
the ‘righteous actions which we cannot stop ourselves from doing’:
We should do only those righteous actions which we cannot stop
ourselves from doing, which we are unable not to do, but, through well
directed attention, we should always keep on increasing the number of
those which we are unable not to do. (Weil 1963: 39)
As we see, the notion of receptive passivity, of ‘we cannot stop ourselves from
doing’, does not rely on a division of the self into its true and its alienated
portions; and this is a crucial respect in which receptive passivity contrasts with
the notion of low passivity. Yet, once we give up such a divide, we may still talk
about some passions being low, but no longer regard all passions as low. The facts
that may identify a certain passion as low will depend, as we shall see, on their
role in the agent’s outlook about what is worth pursuing; and the exercise of
receptive passivity may favor not a mere repression of that low passion, but the
search of a more appropriate expression of the need lying behind it. This suggests
that receptive passivity, far from dividing the self, favors the integration of its
many elements, and this circumstance is connected to the role that receptive
passivity may play in the recovery of one’s psychic health.
In this respect, Moran repeatedly emphasizes that permeability of our
psychological dispositions to our decisions and deliberations should count as a
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criterion of psychic health. I have stressed, however, that the opposite direction of
permeability (i.e. that our decisions and deliberations should be permeable to our
psychological dispositions) is required in order to specify the goal of psycho-
analytic treatment and, therefore, of how psychic health could be recovered by
means of a certain kind of awareness. I will try to show how the notion of
‘receptive passivity’ may take care of this sort of permeability while preserving
the practical commitment that Moran so rightly emphasizes as constitutive of a
strictly first-personal attitude towards oneself. But how could that be at all
possible? Doesn’t receptive passivity involve a detached, theoretical, attitude
towards oneself? The only way in which, according to Moran, an agent may
examine her psychological dispositions is by adopting a theoretical attitude
towards herself. I should then try to specify the nature of receptive passivity, of
‘being forced to’, in such a way that it goes beyond the theoretical attitude and
show how this disparity may be relevant to psychic health.28
10. Receptive Passivity and Psychic Health
10.1 The Experience of Dancing
The experience of dancing may help us to understand why receptive passivity is
essential to the permeability of an agent’s decisions to her psychological
dispositions. The dancer perceives an order in a piece of music which she
expresses in her dancing, in the way she moves her body, but how does this
transition from the music to the dancing body take place? We may first think of a
certain unimaginative dancer. There are many ways in which a dancer may be
rather unimaginative, but I will focus on a particular manner of being dull and
unimaginative, namely: the dancer whose bodily movements are guided by a set
of rules; it does not matter whether she is actually aware of the rules she is
following on each particular occasion or she has instead internalized them to
such a point that she no longer needs to rehearse them. In the light of this, we
may think of an unimaginative agent whose life were governed by a complex set
of rules she has decided to commit herself to.29 The problem we are exploring is
that the agent’s behavior may depart from some such rules, despite her most
strenuous effort to keep it under control. This is, needless to say, the plight in
which both the akratic gambler and Frau Bruggen are trapped. How could they
get out of it? To answer this question, we may look at what the graceful dancer
does, how she guides her body as opposed to what happens to the unimaginative
one. Of course, rules may play a role in graceful dancing, but a limited one. The
graceful dancer has a certain experience of her body as she pays attention to the
music and her body moves in a certain way as a result. Attention to the music, but
also to the emotions and bodily experiences that she senses as deriving from the music, are
then essential to her gracefulness, to her ability to let herself dance the music. The
unimaginative dancer will certainly have a certain experience of her body and
also some emotions will accompany her performance; the worry is rather that she
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will not experience her body and emotions as being in tune with the music, as
being inspired by it. Although this is a matter of degree; the unimaginative
dancer may have some such experiences but she would be connected to the
music in a rather stereotyped or rigid manner; whereas, we might say that, in the
case of the imaginative dancer, such experiences are finely and creatively in tune
with the music. We may thus say that, in order to be passively receptive to the
music, the (graceful) dancer must also be passively receptive to her emotional
and bodily experiences as being (or failing to be) finely in tune with the music,
she must let the latter inspire the movements of her body. This also goes for other
kinds of arts like painting, poetry, theatre, but it may be more obvious in the
dancing case.
Gracefulness is certainly absent in both the akratic gambler and Frau Bruggen.
A criterion of their recovery would be that their actions are proportional to the
circumstances. They know how to make their decisions and commitments
transparent to their reflection about the world, but are incapable of a deeper
kind of transparency or proportionality. Their actions do not express their beliefs
and commitments, despite their effort to keep faithful to them; and, in this sense,
they are like an unimaginative dancer who is disrupted as she tried to follow her
rules. How to render their actions graceful or proportional to the way they see the
world? I suggest that we should try to understand our actions in the light of
dance and we may thereby find a means to reach that goal, akin to the means by
which the unimaginative dancer may learn to follow the music more gracefully.
After all, our actions are a response to the circumstances that we may encounter,
but how is the transition between the circumstances and our actions supposed to
take place? In the case of the unimaginative agent, by means of a number of rules,
but rules are of no use, as we have seen, to Frau Bruggen and the akratic gambler.
Let us, then, concentrate on how an agent may gracefully deal with her behavior.
Like in graceful dancing, rules may play a role, but a limited one. The agent has
an experience of her body as she pays attention to the circumstances and, then,
she acts in a certain way which may be proportional to them. And attention to the
external world, but also to the emotions and bodily experiences which she senses
as deriving from her contact with it, may be essential to her gracefulness, to her
ability to let herself behave gracefully.
One might object that, in responding to some circumstances, an agent may be
quite unaware of the bodily experiences and the specific emotions that such
circumstances may arouse within herself. And this may be quite true as a
statistical fact. This is why I had to resort to an artistic experience to pick up some
aspects of our experience that may go unnoticed in our ordinary dealings with
the most diverse circumstances. It turns out, however, that artistic experience is
not specific to certain objects or activities, even though in our culture one tends to
confine it to some rather special occasions. So, my claim could be put in a
different way: Frau Bruggen could recover her health if she could cultivate an
artistic attitude towards the world and herself. And the feature that I consider
central to that attitude, is a certain exercise of the capacity which I have named
‘receptive passivity’, that is: the exercise which involves paying attention to the
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order in the world, as well as to the bodily experiences and emotions that we
sense our attention to the world gives rise to, and, then, take some decisions if
you like, but also, and crucially, let yourself act. The outcome may be more or less
graceful, as one may be more or less skillful in exercising this sort of receptive
passivity. Much training may be required to become a graceful dancer, and it will
no doubt be even more difficult to learn to perceive one’s own emotions and
bodily experiences both in their details and regarding the significance that each
of them may have in one’s life. This, of course, goes against the Cartesian naive
idea that one is well acquainted with one’s own mental life. Given the prevalence
of wishful thinking and self-deception, we must rather assume the opposite: only
after a slow process of training, plagued with fears and resistances, may an agent
learn to be passively receptive to the different aspects of her experience of the
world.
We may now return to the notion of permeability. In the graceful dancer, her
decisions as to how to move her body are finely sensitive, permeable, to her
emotions and bodily experiences as they are to the order in the music itself. It
may make sense, at some stage in the process of learning, that she should distrust
her bodily experiences in one or another respect, or even that she might have to
learn to look at a piece of music from a perspective which does not come
naturally to her, but only to the end that she may reach a capacity of perception
from which her movements will, later on, flow. The same goes for the graceful
agent. It is not that she should trust her emotions and bodily experiences in every
respect. That would be rather impossible, since, quite often, they go in opposite
directions, as Proust and Musil were so keen to show.30 But she may learn, first,
to discern the different aspects involved in each bodily and emotional response
and, then, recognize the significance that is attached to each of them. One may be
more or less skillful in this respect and, indeed, there is always the risk of
delusion and misperception, as Williams has so much emphasized in introducing
the notion of acknowledgment.
Acknowledgment comes, we may now say, as a result of receptive passivity and, like
the latter, is vulnerable to all sorts of uncertainties. We may use both notions,
‘acknowledgement’ and ‘receptive passivity’, as factive concepts, so that they
could only be appropriately applied when the agent succeeds in their exercise;
but I’d rather prefer to keep them as activities and skills that may fall short of
their best result. Of course, some minimal degree of success is required in order
to recognize a decision as an acknowledgment at all (that is why the akratic
gambler’s decision or Frau Bruggen’s belief, could not be regarded as such) or as
an exercise in receptive passivity, but, beyond that, there is plenty of room for
uncertainty as to whether one will be able to keep faithful to one’s acknowl-
edgments or whether one’s receptive passivity was really finely tuned. And this
is similar to the uncertainty that may assault the dancer as to whether her dance
is really graceful or, on the contrary, it is still stereotyped or affected; and she
could often wonder whether there might be a different approach to a given
piece of music from which a significantly more graceful dance might come out
of her.
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10.2 Receptive Passivity and the Theoretical Attitude
Moran stresses that self-knowledge which derives from a theoretical attitude
towards oneself is not specifically first-personal, since such an attitude appears as
a mere internalization of the observational perspective available to the third
person. Looking at oneself from a theoretical view amounts, on his approach, to
looking at one’s psychological dispositions and events as a passing show and,
therefore, in a detached manner. This alienation from oneself that the theoretical
attitude involves is contrasted with the deliberative attitude, where the agent is
not at all alienated from the reasons she is examining, but ready to be committed
to them. The true self seems then to belong to the deliberative attitude, whereas
the theoretical perspective requires one to regard some parts of oneself as alien, as
only accidentally one’s own. As a result, discovery of theoretical facts about one
psychological condition could not have a denser practical import than the
discovery that one has a broken leg or that one’s car is running out of petrol. All
these circumstances should be regarded as just instrumentally relevant to an
agent’s ultimate goals and values. I am convinced, though, that being passively
receptive to one’s psychological reality has a more intimate scope and
significance. To this purpose I will, firstly, argue that, by being passively receptive
to her emotional and bodily responses,31 the agent ‘is forced to’ acknowledge
some values and goals as articulating her ultimate telos and, in this respect, the
significance of such responses will, unlike the findings of the theoretical attitude,
go beyond instrumentality. I will thereby conclude that receptive passivity could
not belong to the theoretical attitude. In section 103, two further senses will be
explored in which the deliverances of receptive passivity do not play a merely
instrumental role in the agent’s development and recovery.
One easy way to motivate my claim about the practical import of receptive
passivity is to raise the following question: what is the graceful dancer’s true self?
It is hard to see what her true self may consist of, what parts of herself should be
detached or alienated in her dancing. It seems, on the contrary, that dancing
gracefully has to do with integration of music, bodily experiences, emotions,
decisions and actions. The point is not detachment, but integration. And how could
this integration be reached if she adopted an alienated attitude, like the
theoretical one, towards her emotions and bodily experiences in her way to dance
gracefully? To put it briefly, to assume that the theoretical attitude is appropriate
towards one’s own emotions and bodily experiences, presupposes a clear-cut
(and significant) distinction between the true self and what is alien to it; whereas
receptive passivity has been designed to challenge such a divide. So, receptive
passivity does not vindicate the view that our emotions and bodily experiences
belong to our true self, but just that such a notion only makes sense within a
framework that should be abandoned, and the evaluative notions that will
emerge within my alternative approach, will rather insist on whether an agent
expresses herself in a certain action more or less gracefully or rigidly, shallowly
or deeply, violently or smoothly, and the like. And some such evaluations may
invite a change in the way the agent leads her life.
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A consequence of the notion of the ‘true self’ is that our emotions and bodily
experiences have a merely instrumental value for the development of the agent.
The findings of a theoretical attitude towards oneself should have, as we have
seen, a practical import similar to the discovery that the road we intend to drive
through was closed. In the same way in which our knowledge about the state of
the road my affect our intermediate goals as to how to go to a certain place, or
even invite us to give up such a trip, so knowledge of our own psychological
condition may alter some intermediate goals, but does not contribute to fixing
what one’s ultimate goals should be, since that is a matter that only concerns the
true self, as it is paradigmatically stated in Kant’s moral theory. We may thus say
that the theoretical attitude ensures an instrumental permeability of our
deliberations to our psychological condition. My claim is, however, that the
kind of permeability that is required to understand the healing character of some
kinds of awareness is more profound. Our emotions and bodily experiences
should contribute to fix our ultimate telos or, to put it another way, our
deliberation about ‘How should one live?’ cannot start but by listening to our
emotions and bodily experiences in the most diverse occasions.32 Once we give
up the notion of a true self, as is obvious in the case of dancing, then it should be
clear that it could not be otherwise: where else should we look first in order to
acknowledge a certain telos as one’s own?
Some may, finally, reply that, even if receptive passivity should not be
construed as belonging to the theoretical attitude, this may not count as a serious
challenge to Moran’s approach, since receptive passivity could form a part of the
other, complementary, attitude, namely: the deliberative one. I have no objection
to regarding receptive passivity as a deliberative skill, since, as matter of fact, this
is the way I think it should be construed. However, in that case, the significance
of Moran’s distinction between the deliberative and the theoretical attitudes
would be severely altered and deflated. In particular, the role of the theoretical
attitude in the life of a healthy agent would become rather insignificant, to the
point that a persistent tendency to adopt that attitude towards oneself may
appear as a criterion of psychic illness; and, on the other hand, the nature of
deliberation should be redesigned, so that emotions and bodily experiences
should play a relevant role within it.
10.3 Psychic Health
10.3.1 Expression
The significance of one’s emotions and bodily experiences goes deeper than just
contributing to determine one’s ultimate goals. Think again of the graceful
dancer and how her emotions and bodily experiences are relevant to the
movements of her body. It is not just that paying attention to such experiences is
instrumentally beneficial to her graceful dancing. We should rather regard as a
criterion of a graceful dance that it should express her emotions and bodily
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experiences as being finely in tune with the order contained in the music. We may
thus say that such experiences are constitutive of what may count as a graceful
dance insofar as they are expressed by the dancer through her bodily movements.
And the same goes for other sorts of action. The reason why Frau Bruggen was
taken to Freud’s surgery was that she displayed an obsessive behavior towards
her husband; obsessive to the point that everyone in the family could not help
noticing it. It was obsessive because it was not proportional to the fact, which she
sincerely claimed to believe, that her husband hadn’t betrayed her. We may
regard Frau Bruggen’s obsessive behavior as a rigid and ungraceful manifesta-
tion of an emotion of hers, namely: her love for her son-in-law. The point is not
that she should come to believe, in the trivial sense, that she was in love with her
son-in-law. That goal might easily be reached in the light of relevant evidence.
The goal of her therapy was that she could relate to this emotion in such a way
that she could somehow express it in her life, that is, that her body could
appropriately dance the music of being in love. To put it another way, Frau
Bruggen would only recover her health if she could depart from her
ungracefulness and, therefore, if she managed to fully experience her emotion for
her son-in-law and act in such a way that such an emotion were sufficiently expressed.33
She tried to reach that goal by disguising her feelings under the safe surface of
motherly care, but that was not enough. And, in order to go beyond that, she
would have to revise her moral outlook (which so far she took to constitute an
essential part of her true self) in the light of her emotions and bodily experiences.
This way we come back to the second direction of permeability and apprehend a
deeper sense in which our ultimate telos should be inspired by our emotions and
bodily experiences if psychic health is to be recovered or maintained. A
psychoanalytic approach to the akratic gambler’s case would favor a similar
account of his plight, only that, in this case, the therapist would still have to find
out the need or desire that is actually manifested through his compulsion and in
want of being properly expressed. To close, let me just mention an important
element that stands in the way of the required transformation on the patient’s
side, and how receptive passivity itself may help us to alleviate it.
10.3.2 Inner Figures
In this paper, we have been concerned with the kind of cognitive relation to
oneself that is specifically first-personal. This concern presupposes a conception
of the agent as being able to look upon herself. Moran has distinguished two
ways of relating to oneself which I have connected to the Kantian (and Cartesian)
distinction between what constitutes one’s true self and what is alienated from it.
Now, I would like to briefly suggest how this picture is connected to the
experience of guilt, which is the standard source of the kind of obsessive behavior
that psychoanalytic therapy is meant to repair. I will, firstly, sketch why I think
the experience of guilt involves a certain attitude towards oneself, namely: that of
a severe judge, which may, nevertheless, have a more or less extended role in an
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agent’s life; secondly, I will show how the attitude of a severe judge may easily
lead to alienation and neurosis, and how the exercise of receptive passivity favors
the emergence of an alternative, more unifying, way of relating to oneself, closer
to the way a caring mother looks after her offspring or friends take care of each
other. And, finally, it will become clear why such a new attitude may help the
patient to restore her psychic health.
The experience of guilt has a rather global and devastating effect upon the self.
When the agent feels guilty at having done something wrong, she not only feels
that she has to provide for some compensation or accept a certain sanction; she
also regards herself as worthless, as someone whose life has been called into
question. Following on from Gabrielle Taylor, Richard Wollheim and Bernard
Williams,34 I have argued elsewhere that such an emotion cannot be explained by
the mere acceptance, on the agent’s side, that she has infringed a principle that
she endorses; for the agent may feel guilty even if she doesn’t endorse the
principle. Further considerations allow me to conclude that the global and
devastating effect of guilt can only be explained by the experience of being accused
by someone with authority.35 The view I defend is that the agency that carries out
such an accusation is connected in complex ways to the agent’s actual external
critics, and it is essentially experienced by her as an inner figure that accuses her
or, more exactly, as an inner figure who adopts towards her the role of a severe
judge. A life guided by such a figure is prone to fall into the sort of neurosis that
Freud originally tried to cure. Frau Bruggen is, in this respect, a standard case.
Her obsessive behavior arises as a result of a severe condemnation of her being in
love with her son-in-law, which leads to repression of such a passion to the point
that she is fully unaware of both the existence of such a passion and the fact that
it has been condemned. This is the way the inner severe judge acts: no trace is left
either of what is censored or of the existence of censorship itself. As a result, a
confused experience of anguish may arise, which psychoanalysis may track back
to the accusation of such inner agency, whose profile is that of a severe judge.
So, it comes as no surprise that a significant number of people should stress
that they do not have any phenomenological experience of such inner figures; for
an explanation of such absence should not significantly differ from the way
psychoanalysis explains why Frau Bruggen is unaware of her being in love with
her son-in-law. Both explanations should be tested in a similar way: firstly, like
any causal disposition it may be confirmed by appeal to its behavioral displays;36
and, secondly, by the agent’s phenomenology as she may, at some point, learn to
experience her own inner figures. Some people experience them quite
straightforwardly, some others require some training (like the training required
to dance gracefully) to experience them. Once again, artistic production may
serve to motivate my point; but not through the experience of producing a work
of art, as I have being doing so far, but by examining what some such works may
reveal about our ordinary experiences. For, in my view, some classic works of art
seem to provide a detailed description of the experience of guilt as I understand
it, namely: as the experience of being accused by a severe judge. Think, for
instance, of Crime and Punishment by Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Letter to his Father and
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The Castle by Franz Kafka, Autumn Fall by Ingmar Bergman, and Opening Night
by John Cassavetes, not to mention the confessions of Augustine and Rousseau,
as well as Primo Levi’s The Drowned and the Saved.37
It is easy to see, moreover, that the image of one’s life being examined by a
severe judge permeates the Christian tradition and, certainly, lies at the bottom of
the Kantian (and Cartesian) struggle between the true self and its natural
inclinations. The latter are to be distrusted and kept under control, since they
may only accidentally coincide with the dictates of reason which should inspire
the life of the true self. By this simple move, our natural inclinations are alienated
and presented as a threat to the agent’s ability to be guided by reason alone.
Natural inclinations, no matter what they might be on each particular occasion,
are already condemned and an unredeemable division within the agent is,
thereby, taken for granted. Moran’s distinction between the deliberative and the
theoretical attitudes, even if meant to get rid of this picture, is still, in my view,
trapped by it, given that knowledge of one’s own psychological dispositions is
reserved to the theoretical attitude, which is, as we have seen, an alienated
attitude towards oneself.
I have been arguing that receptive passivity departs in an essential way from
that alienated attitude towards one’s emotions and bodily experiences, since it
should be rather interpreted in the light of the way the graceful dancer relates to
her own experiences. And, as I have highlighted, the aim of the graceful dancer is
not detachment, but integration, namely: the kind of integration that expression
provides. A consequence of a patient’s exercise of receptive passivity towards
those aspects of oneself that may, at any stage, be accessible to that attitude, may
gradually give rise to an alternative inner figure as the main perspective from
which one looks at one’s successes and one’s failures, at one’s aggressive
behavior and one’s generous gestures. For receptive passivity sees, behind each
misgiving or failure, a need of the self that requires to be properly attended to
or expressed. So, whenever the agent distances herself from a certain action
or attitude of hers, the complementary move comes as to how what is manifested
through that alienated behavior or attitude, could be adequately integrated and
expressed. And the way in which this ‘how’ is explored does not take us back to
the theoretical attitude, but to a further exercise of receptive passivity in paying
attention to the nuances of one’s emotional responses and bodily experiences in
the more diverse circumstances.38 In any case, it seems clear that the inner figure
that may emerge from the exercise of receptive passivity will be closer to that of a
caring mother or a close friend than to that of a severe judge. It comes, then, as no
surprise that a patient who is able to shape this inner figure and gives a
significant role to it in her life, will reach a kind of integration which a life guided
by the figure of a severe judge excludes.39
11. Conclusion
There is much that I admire in Moran’s approach to first-person authority and
self-knowledge as an achievement. First of all, his stress that a merely theoretical
352 Josep E. Corbı´
r 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
attitude towards oneself is not intimate enough to be specifically first-personal
and, secondly, his attempt to characterize the kind of self-knowledge that
constitutes a strictly first-personal achievement. My paper has focused on this
second issue and, more specifically, on Moran’s characterization of the goal of
psychoanalytic treatment, which goes beyond the mere theoretical acceptance of
the analyst interpretation, and demands a more intimate, first-personal,
awareness of one’s own psychological condition.
Although Moran’s notions of permeability, transparency and avowal point in
the appropriate direction, I have argued that they cannot satisfactorily account
for the goal of psychoanalytic treatment, given that they are inspired by a
Cartesian picture of the self. In particular, I have shown that, even though Moran
proposes a single Transparency Condition and a single notion of avowal, we
cannot understand their role in the description of psychoanalytic therapy unless
we distinguish between a trivial and a deeper condition of transparency, as well
as between a trivial and a deep notion of avowal. Armed with these distinctions,
we can improve our understanding of psychoanalytic practice. Yet, Moran’s
clear-cut distinction between the deliberative and the theoretical attitudes is
inconsistent with a satisfactory description of such a practice. For, in the light of
such a distinction, we cannot make sense of the double direction of permeability
and, more specifically, of the sense in which an agent’s decisions and projects
may be permeable to her psychological condition. I have taken advantage of
Williams’ notion of acknowledgment and Weil’s distinction between two notions
of necessity, in order to articulate a cognitive way of relating to oneself which is
as specifically first-personal as Moran’s deliberative attitude and, nevertheless,
allows us to account for that complementary direction of permeability. I have
appealed to the experience of the graceful dancer, as opposed to the
unimaginative one, as a way of elucidating what I mean by being passively
receptive to one’s own emotions and bodily experiences, and how such an
attitude should be distinguished from a theoretical one. I have, finally, sketched
how such an exercise of receptive passivity may be crucial in describing the goal
of psychoanalytic treatment and, therefore, in helping us to understand how a
certain kind of awareness may have a significant healing effect.40
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NOTES
1 ‘She was at that time already in love with Arnheim, who had by this time called on
her more than once, but in her inexperience she had no inkling of the nature of her feeling.
They talked about what it is . . . that ennobles the flesh between the sole of the foot and the
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crown of the head and transforms the confused impressions of civilized life into harmonious
spiritual vibrations. But even this was a great deal, and because Diotima was inclined to
caution and always on guard against compromising herself, this intimacy struck her as too
sudden, and she had to mobilize truly great emotions, the very greatest, in fact, and where
were they most likely to be found? Where everyone has shifted them, to the drama of
history. For Diotima and Arnheim the Parallel Campaign was, so to speak, a safety island in
the swelling traffic of their souls. They regarded it as clearly fated that they should have
been brought together at such an important moment, and they could not agree more that the
great patriotic enterprise was an immense opportunity and responsibility for intellectual
people . . . So in Diotima the Parallel Campaign had become inextricably bound up with
Arnheim; given way to a copious abundance. Her hope that the great treasures of feeling
embodied in the Austrian heritage could be strengthened by Prussian intellectual discipline
was now most happily justified, and these impressions were so strong that this normally
very correct woman had not realized what a breach of protocol she had committed in
undertaking to invite Arnheim to the inaugural conference. Now there was no retreat;
anyway, Arnheim, who sensed how it had happened, found it essentially disarming,
however annoyed he was at finding himself in a false position; and His Grace was basically
too fond of his friend Diotima to show his surprise beyond his first, involuntary, recoil. He
met Diotima’s explanation with silence and after an awkward little pause amiably held out
his hand to Arnheim, assuring him in the most civil and complementary terms that he was
welcome, as in fact he was’ (Musil 1995: 178–9, cf. also 197–199).
2 I will, later on, emphasize the relevance of psychoanalytic therapy for a satisfactory
account of self-knowledge as an achievement, cf. section 5 and ff.
3 Cf. Williams 1981: ch. 9–10; 1985: ch. 10 and postscript; 1993: ch. 4; and 2002: ch. 8.
4 Cf. Weil 1963: 38–44.
5 ‘Sartre’s case if the akratic gambler who resolves to stop gambling is in some ways a
more helpful example for considering the two stances and the contrasting roles of
commitment (of oneself) and theoretical knowledge about oneself. For the gambler to have
made such a decision is to be committed to avoiding the gaming tables . . . . But now, at the
same time, he does know himself empirically too; he knows his history, and from this
point of view his ‘‘resolution’’ is a psychological fact about him with a certain degree of
strength’ (Moran 2001: 79; cf. also Sartre 2003: part II, sec. 1).
6 ‘There is one kind of evasion in the empty denial of one’s facticity (e.g. one’s history
of weakness and fallibility), as if to say ‘‘Don’t worry about my actual history of letting you
down, for I hereby renounce and transcend all that’’. But there is also evasion in
submerging oneself in facticity, as if to say, ‘‘Of course, whether I will in fact disappoint
you again is a fully empirical question. You know as much as I do as to what the
probabilities are, and so you can plan accordingly’’’ (Moran 2001: 81).
7 ‘The following chapter takes up the idea of the contrast between deliberative and
theoretical stances toward oneself, and the ineliminability of the demands of either of
them, beginning with the relatively straightforward case of belief’ (Moran 2001: 65).
8 I take it that the most serious line of reasoning against this possibility comes from
Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument, which, in turn, is closely connected to his
analysis of rule following (cf. Wittgenstein 1953; Kripke 1982; Wright 2001; McDowell 1998;
Finkelstein 2003: ch. 4).
9 Some approaches to self-knowledge seek to avoid the pitfalls of Cartesianism while
accounting for first-person authority in terms of a privileged (although not infallible)
observational access to one’s own mental states. Such approaches have often a rather
different philosophical motivation. They aim at rendering first-person authority consistent
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with physicalism, whereby much in the attraction of such views derives, once again, from
an independent philosophical conviction (cf., for instance, Armstrong 1968; Lycan 1996;
Mellor 1977–78; and Churchland 1984).
10 Needless to say, this objection also affects those observational approaches that seek
to render first-person authority consistent with physicalism.
11 ‘In much the same way that his actions cannot be for him just part of the passing
show, so his beliefs and other attitudes must be seen by him as expressive of his various
and evolving relations to his environment, and not as a mere succession of representations
(to which, for some reason, he is the only witness’ (Moran 2001: 32).
12 There is the issue as to how much deliberation is involved in forming an intention or
making a decision. Several commentators agree that there is a tendency in Moran to over-
rationalize agency (cf. Finkelstein 2003: appendix; Heal 2004; and Prades 2007), to over-
emphasize the role of reasons in forming intentions and acquiring beliefs. This is an issue
that I will discuss in only one respect. I will argue that Moran’s conception of the
deliberative attitude is not consistent with an appropriate description of the goal of
psychoanalytic treatment and, relatedly, the kind of awareness that has a repairing effect.
And, as we shall see, the modifications that are needed in order to provide such a
description go in the direction of a less intellectual conception of one’s intentions and beliefs.
13 Moran’s distinction is inspired in the akratic gambler’s case, which, in turn, is the
paradigmatic case for a traditional conception of the self as divided into reason, passion
and the will. So, it comes as no surprise that Moran’s model falls into the traps of that
traditional model and has problems in identifying the kind of awareness that may have
healing effects on the agent’s psychic health. But this is an issue to be discussed in later
sections.
14 Moran 2001: 62.
15 ‘Behavioral dispositions’ should be interpreted here in a rather neutral way. By
using the word ‘behavior’ I am not assuming that an agent’s conduct should be described
in any specific vocabulary, like, for instance, a vocabulary deprived of intentional terms.
On the contrary, I would be happy to grant that, in order to identify behavioral
dispositions, we could avail ourselves of whatever concepts we ordinarily use to identify
and explain our conduct.
16 It seems to me that, contrary to what Moran assumes, contexts where we may find it
relevant to raise question (a) are those where we suspect that there is a mismatch between
our answer to question (b) and the sort of belief that our behavioral dispositions display.
To put it in other words, question (a) is more often raised in a theoretical manner than a
deliberative one. Cf. Shoemaker 2003 and Bensusan and Pinedo 2007 for a defense of the
relevance of question (an) and, therefore, of (a) raised from a theoretical perspective.
17 In a similar vein, Moran stresses that ‘an avowal of one’s belief, by contrast, is not
made on any psychologically explanatory basis, and is rather the expression of one’s own
present commitment to the truth of the proposition in question’ (Moran 2001: 89).
18 ‘Or he may learn of his own desire in a way that approaches the purely theoretical
or behavioral, and is quite different from any reflection on what in the world is good or
worth desiring. Such a division between two sorts of consideration may well represent a
failure of sorts (of rationality, willpower, or something else), but nonetheless any
equivalence between them is not something guaranteed by the logic of the first-person, but
looks more like a kind of normative ideal’ (Moran 2001: 62) and, similarly: ‘. . . or answer a
question of the form ‘‘Is this what I really want?’’ in terms of considerations of what is
worth wanting, and thereby come to clarify the structure of his actual desires. The fact that
we do have this capacity should not be controversial, for it amounts to the idea that part of
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what it is to be a rational agent is to be able to subject one’s attitudes to review in a way
that makes a difference to what one’s attitude is’ (Moran 2001: 64).
19 Bernard Reginster raises an issue which points in the same direction as mine:
‘Avowals contribute to self-knowledge, then, by virtue of being also ‘‘reports’’. But
reporting seems inherently ‘‘third-personal’’, insofar as it involves the self-distancing of
self-objectification. When I know the contents of my mind by avowing them, I therefore
seem to occupy both perspectives at the same time. If the two perspectives are not
incompatible, one should wonder why Sartre’s gambler or the rakehell could not both fully
endorse their respective attitudes and invoke them as empirical facts supporting a
prediction about the future behavior of the one, or a more favorable assessment of the
character of the other. If avowing is also reporting, then there are reports that are also
avowals, so that their reliance on the reports as mere empirical facts need not be
paradoxical and self-defeating’ (Reginster 2004: 438).
20 To discern one’s real psychological condition is a rather complex and endless task.
Primo Levi stressed, for instance, how difficult it was for him to determine where the
boundaries lied between bad faith and self-deception, as he was considering SS members’
reports of their activities during the Nazis regime: ‘Now, anyone who has sufficient
experience of human affairs knows that the distinction . . . good faith/bad faith is
optimistic and illuminist, and is all the more so, and for much greater reason, when
applied to men such as those just mentioned. It presupposes a mental clarity that few
have, and which even these few immediately lose when, for whatever reason, past or
present reality arouses anxiety or discomfort in them. Under such conditions there are, it is
true, those who lie consciously, coldly falsifying reality itself, but more numerous are those
who weigh anchor, move off, momentarily or for ever, from genuine memories, and
fabricate for themselves a convenient reality. The past is a burden to them; they feel
repugnance for the things done or suffered, and tend to replace them with others . . . . The
silent transition from falsehood to self-deception is useful: anyone who lies in good faith is
better off, he recites his part better, is more easily believed by the judge, the historian, the
reader, his wife and his children’ (Levi 1986: 14).
In a similar vein, Primo Levi emphasizes how hard it was to unveil his real experience
of liberation from the stereotyped image of it. It took a time to find out that, in contrast
with the standard picture, the experience of most survivors was permeated with shame
and guilt: ‘And, finally, among the testimonies, written or heard, there are also those that
are unconsciously stylised, in which convention prevails over genuine memory: ‘‘whoever
is freed from slavery rejoices. I too was liberated, hence I too rejoice over it.’’ In all films, all
novels, just as in Fidelio the shattering of the chains is a moment of solemn or fervid
jubilation, and so was mine. This is a specific case of that drifting of memory I mentioned
in the first chapter, and which is accentuated with the passing of years and the piling up of
the experiences of others, true or presumed, on the layer of one’s own’ (Levi 1986: 53). For
a rather systematic exploration of the difficulties in discerning aspect’s of one’s experience
underneath the stereotyped imaged of it that one has internalized, cf. Proust 2003: v. 7 and
Musil 1995.
21 Cf. Hampshire 1975; Moran 2001: sec. 2.5 and Williams 2002: ch. 8.
22 Given the prevalence of self-deception and wishful thinking for the most relevant
cases of identification, an agent’s first-person authority can certainly be challenged; and
the same concerns can also be motivated from a social and political perspective:
It is not foolish to believe that any social and political order which effectively uses
power, and which sustains a culture that means something to the people who live
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in it, must involve opacity, mystification, and large-scale deception. Reasonable
people can believe, contrary to the ideals of liberalism, that human beings cannot
live together effectively, at least on any culturally ambitious scale, if they
understand fully what they are doing. It is not necessarily foolish to believe these
things, but they may not be true, and we can still live in the hope (a hope we shall
come back to in the next chapter) that they are not. (Williams 2002: 232; cf. Weil
1963: 16–7 for the role of imagination in self-deception)
One could also argue that, with regard to some mental states and attitudes, we cannot
endow the agent with first-person authority, not even prima facie. Diotima may have prima
facie authority as she ascribes to herself the intention to invite Arnheim to dinner, since
only under rather strange circumstances could a third party challenge it intelligibly. It is
less clear, however, whether we should endow her with such authority with regard to her
feelings towards Arnheim and, if we granted it, her authority could rather easily be put
into question. And this goes for many other intentions and emotions, including Frau
Bruggen’s love for her son-in-law. In fact, it takes the efforts of Marcel Proust or Robert
Musil (cf. Proust 2003; Musil 1995, as well as endnote 24) to discern the ultimate intentions
and emotions involved in a certain action or attitude, and even that, is, in the end, rather
indeterminate. This fits with the mental ontology that the notion of acknowledgment
requires, namely: that our mental states do not constitute a determinate set of desires and
beliefs, but are shaped by the process of deliberation and the agent’s practical
commitments.
23 This notion is connected with a concept of practical necessity that has been thoroughly
explored in other writings, namely: a sort of practical necessity that is placed somewhere
between the Kantian distinction between a hypothetical and a categorical imperative.
Williams’ insistence on the moral agent as an agent with a character goes in a similar
direction (cf. Williams 1981: ch. 9–10; 1985: ch. 10 and postscript, 1993. ch. 4; and 2002: ch. 8).
24 Cf. Corbi 2007 for some initial remarks in this direction.
25 ‘So what then is the source of my mistakes? It must be simply this: the scope of the
will is wider than that of the intellect; but instead of restricting it within the same limits, I
extend its use to matters which I do not understand. Since the will is indifferent in such
cases, it easily turns aside from what is true and good, and this is the source of my error
and sin’ (Descartes 1996: 41). A couple of pages later, he concludes: ‘The cause of error
must surely be the one I have explained; for if, whenever I have to make a judgement, I
restrain my will so that it extends to what the intellect clearly and distinctly reveals, and no
further, then it is quite impossible for me to go wrong’ (Descartes 1996: 43).
26 This understanding of Kant’s conception of morality is, to say the least, favored by a
relevant number of texts. Let me just quote a remark on the nature of respect which seems
to confirm my interpretation:
It could be objected that I only seek refuge, behind the word respect, in an obscure
feeling, instead of distinctly resolving the question by means of a concept of
reason. But though respect is a feeling, it is not one received by means of influence;
it is, instead, a feeling self-wrought by means of a rational concept and therefore
specifically different from all feelings of the first kind, which can be reduced to
inclination or fear. What I cognize immediately as a law for me I cognize with
respect, which signifies merely consciousness of the subordination of my will to a
law without the mediation of other influences on my sense. Immediate
determination of the will by means of the law and consciousness of this is called
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respect so that this is regarded as the effect of the law on the subject, and not as the
cause of the law. (Kant 1997: 4:101).
27 Carlos Moya seeks to articulate an anti-skeptical project with regard to free will out of
the kind of responsibility that an agent may have for her own beliefs. Moya does not focus
on the kind of responsibility that an agent may have for the cognitive activities in which she
may engage in order to acquire a certain belief, since this line of argument will be prey to the
skeptical arguments against responsibility for actions. On the contrary, he stresses that one
may be praised or blamed for activities that do not depend on making the right decisions or
keeping ultimate control, but on a phenomenon that I would describe as being passively
receptive to a certain order: ‘As a first step towards a characterization of this sort of control,
let us think of someone who is carrying out a rather complicated addition without an
electronic calculator. She performs the task carefully and gets the right result. She is
praiseworthy on both accounts, and has had control over both the process and its result. It is
not a matter of luck that she has got it right. But think what having control amounts to in this
case. It does not have to do with choices or acts of will in any important sense. The control
she has consists rather in her yielding to the internal structure of the thing itself, the figures
and the addition rules. It is, so to speak, a passive form of control, which she exercises
precisely in being guided by what is there, in the addition problem. She does not choose the
rules. In fact, she would lose control of the process if she chose the rules (or the figures), and
she would rightly be blamed if she did that. She has neither chosen nor created either the
rules or the figures. They come ‘‘from outside’’ her self or her will. But this does not exclude
her having deep control over her belief about the result of the addition’ (Moya 2004: 176–7).
In a rather interesting way, Moya applies this sort of passivity not only to calculations, but to
other sorts of scientific activities and also literary creation.
28 It is difficult to examine the role that receptive passivity should have in the life of an
agent without being entangled in some vexed philosophical issues. Let me just mention two
of them: the fact-value distinction, and the idea that mental states should just have one or
another direction of fit, but not both. In this note, I will mainly argue why we should leave
such issues aside for a while, as we discern how receptive passivity may be involved in
some paradigmatic experiences. Later on, one might decide to revise one’s views on those
issues in the light of my discernment of such experiences or, on the contrary, challenge that
discernment inasmuch as it may conflict with some rather general considerations.
The notion of ‘receptive passivity’ has certainly been introduced by appeal to some
cases where the order to which the agent is receptive seems to be placed outside herself
and exist independently of our practices. Some may think that this is true in the case of
tracking the movement of an object, and equally so in following a mathematical
demonstration; but significantly less external with regard to the personality of a character
or the musical order that the actress and the dancer are respectively supposed to follow;
and, finally, it is of course even more controversial to apply this idea of externality to the
alleged moral aspects on which, according to Weil, an agent must focus her attention. In
any case, the answer to the question about how external or internal, how objective or
subjective, the order involved in each of these examples may be, will depend on one’s
stance regarding some vexed issues on the fact-value distinction (cf. Corbı´ 2004 for a
discussion of this issue with regard to moral features). I do not think I can ultimately
defend my position about receptive passivity without taking sides on such issues. There
are views on such questions that are rather favorable to this notion and others that exclude
it. I should confine myself to saying, in this respect, that the role that I attribute to receptive
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passivity presupposes the irreducibility of a certain epistemic ability: aspect perception. This
will become clear in the next section, where I appeal to the experience of the graceful
dancer as an illuminating exercise in receptive passivity. I will argue that, in order to dance
gracefully, she must see the music, her bodily experiences, and her bodily movements as
internally connected, as being finely in tune. It is easy to see why aspect perception is
involved here. As the dancer practices a new piece of music, part of her getting in touch
with such a piece will require some experiences like seeing a certain movement of her arm
as fitting (or failing to fit) with the music or as being dull or, perhaps, too emphatic. This
will appear to her as the dawning of one or another aspect of the music and her dance. She
may invite other, less acute, dancers to see some aspects which, in her view, may help them
to embellish their dance and to which they may still be blind. The dawning of an aspect
and aspect blindness are constitutive of aspect perception, and such experiences are
inescapably present as we listen to a piece of music but also in many other experiences like
contemplating a painting or understanding a mathematical demonstration, as Wittgenstein
is so keen to stress (cf. Wittgenstein 1953).
Hence, we may just disregard, for the sake of argument, the issue as to the metaphysical
significance of questions such as whether the order that the agent perceives is internal or
external, evaluative or not, and treat them as specific questions of fact that may be raised
within a certain discursive practice. To close, let me say that one might also construe the
conflict between some metaphysical views and the epistemic capacities presupposed in
the notion of receptive passivity as an invitation to shift the burden of proof. Instead of
objecting to the notion of receptive passivity in the light of a certain general view about the
fact-value distinction, we may regard some experiences of receptive passivity as an
invitation to revise such a general view. This is the way I suggest remarks in the next
section should be taken, namely, as reflections on certain cognitive experiences whose
features differ, at least prima facie, from those of a theoretical attitude. Another issue is
whether they should ultimately be distinguished, but this would require me to enter a
debate far beyond the limits of this paper.
Some may also be tempted to think that aspect perception is, after all, a kind of
perception and, therefore, involves a detached attitude, which we have presented as the
hallmark of the theoretical attitude. Hence, we cannot reasonably expect that a certain kind
of perception could bring about the sort of transformation that may restore an agent’s
psychic health. Here again, we are confronted with a vexed philosophical issue closely
connected to the previous one, since, in this line of reasoning, we are assuming that there
could not be a conceptual connection between perceiving a certain fact and being
motivated to respond to it in a certain way. So, one is taking for granted that any mental
state or attitude should have one or another direction of fit, like beliefs and desires seem to
have, but it makes no sense that a single state could connect both directions of fit. It is
unclear to me why this possibility should be excluded. I do not see, for instance, how the
ability to perceive that a certain conclusion follows from a premise could be conceptually
independent of the agent’s inclination to take advantage of such a conclusion in certain
circumstances. And something similar goes for the perception of the moral aspects of a
given situation. But, needless to say, there is no room in this paper to discuss this complex
issue. Let me, then, ask you to suspend your judgment as to whether aspect perception
necessarily involves a detached attitude towards its intentional object, and let us see what
we can learn about it by exploring how receptive passivity may (at least, prima facie) differ
from the kind of passivity involved in the theoretical attitude, while also seeing how such
a disparity may be central to understanding the point of psychoanalytic therapy.
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29 This is the way John Ruskin distinguishes between the unimaginative painter and
the imaginative one (cf. Ruskin: 2000: 165).
30 Cf. Proust 2003 and Musil 1995.
31 I am not assuming that the agent should only be passively receptive to her emotional
and bodily responses. For, on the one hand her responses are after all responses to some
features of the world and, on the other hand, I am convinced there is no way in which at
least some such features could be individuated regardless of how we respond to them. The
issue as to how this last claim could be consistent with claiming that such features are,
after all, features of the world, would take us into the debate about realism which I meant to
sidestep in this paper.
32 We cannot enter into the complexities of Spinoza’s philosophy, but his insistence on
the strength of affections and their crucial relevance in defining good and evil, seems to be
oriented by a similar intuition (cf. Spinoza: 1992, parts IV and V); in fact, Weil’s distinction
between two notions of necessity and obedience was directly influenced by Spinoza’s
views on such matters.
33 Finkelstein (2003) defends a rather powerful view about self-knowledge and, in
particular, examines in some detail how the unconscious versus conscious distinction
relates to the idea of expression. His view in connected in different ways to mine, and his
main point on the matter goes like this:
Someone’s mental state is conscious if he has an ability to express it merely by self-
ascribing it. If he lacks such an ability with respect to one of his mental states, it is
unconscious. On this account of the distinction between conscious and
unconscious mental states, my intention to read Nick Hornby’s most recent
novel is conscious not by virtue of my knowing about it, or my knowing about it
in a particular way, but by virtue of my being able to express it merely by saying,
‘I intend to read Nick Hornby’s most recent novel’. (pp. 120–1)
34 Cf., in this respect, Taylor 1985; Williams 1993; Wollheim 1999; and Corbi MS.
35 Cf. Corbi MS for a discussion of this issue. In Corbi 2006, I defend the significance of
this conception of guilt for the debate about moral particularism. The fact that an agent’s
character is partly formed by an internalization of how others talk to her and descriptions
of her, is connected to Musil’s notion of petrification (cf. Musil 1995: §§34–40) and Proust’s
insistence on the tendency to confuse the stereotyped experience with experience itself
(cf. Proust 2003: mainly v. 7). Both writers connect these phenomena to the experience of
emptiness and lack of sense.
36 Cf. Corbi and Prades 2000: ch. 3 for a discussion of this issue.
37 Dostoyevsky 2002; Kafka 1987, 1988; Augustine 1998; Rousseau 2008; and Levi 1986.
38 Gestalt therapy (cf. Perls et al. 1977), which I regard as a rather important
development of Freud’s psychoanalytic theory, offers a detailed account as to how such
exercises should be performed in order to transform the main inner figure in the light of
which a patient looks upon herself.
39 This change in the attitude towards oneself also plays a role in the way the agent sees
others. As is clear in the case of guilt (and even more clearly in that of shame), part of the
pressure upon oneself comes from a tendency to adapt to the voice of others, to hear their
voices as having normative import. Now that the agent is able to take his own needs into
consideration, he is also on the way to setting a limit on those voices and, therefore, the
agent is less prone to see the others as a threat.
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40 I feel indebted to Manuel Garcı´a-Carpintero, Diego Lawler, Richard Moran, Josep L.
Prades and an anonymous referee of this journal for detailed discussion on various aspects
of this paper. I have also benefited from remarks by Carla Bagnoli, Fernando Broncano,
Ambro`s Domingo, Christopher Hookway, Miracle Garrido, Tobies Grimaltos, Julia´n
Marrades, Vero´nica Martı´nez, Carlos Moya, Vero´nica Pela´ez, Diana Pe´rez, Sergi Rosell,
Lino San Juan, Vicente Sanfe´lix, Jennifer Saul, Gianfranco Soldati, and Jesu´s Vega. Thanks
are also due to participants in the XVI Inter-University Workshop on Philosophy and Cognitive
Science (Valencia, March, 27–29, 2006) Segundo Encuentro Hispano-Argentino de Filosofı´a
Analı´tica (Buenos Aires, September 25–27, 2008), and Mind and Language-2 (Madrid,
January 22–23, 2008) for their questions and comments. Let me, finally, acknowledge that
research for this paper has been funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation
(BFF2003-08335-C03-01, HUM2006-08236) and the Valencian Regional Ministry of Culture,
Education and Sports (GRUPOS04/48, GV04B-251, ACOMP06/13).
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